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Self-Determination and the Legality of
Biafra's Secession Under International Law
PIus L. OKORONKWO*
I. INTRODUCTION
The African continent has been wracked by an unending
spate of civil wars. One such war, the Nigerian Civil War of 1967
to 1970, stemmed from Biafra's decision to establish itself as a
sovereign state. In an exercise of the right of self-determination,
Biafra unilaterally declared its independence from Nigeria on May
30, 1967.
Self-determination has been construed as the right of peoples
to determine their own destiny and form of government. For
example, self-determination can be based on a peoples' desire to
be free from colonial rule. Self-determination may be exercised,
inter alia, through the establishment of a sovereign independent
state, by integration, or by association with another state. The
exact meaning of self-determination is enmeshed in controversy.
Despite the plethora of international instruments recognizing
the principle of self-determination, certain peoples continue to be
in conflict with their parent states over the exercise of this right.
Regrettably, no international instrument adequately defines the
principle, nor identifies who is entitled to exercise the right. This
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makes it difficult to determine the precise scope and content of the
right.
The imprecise nature of the right of self-determination,
especially outside the colonial context, has led to uncertainties and
inconsistencies in its application by various states, as well as by the
United Nations. This inconsistency is the result of the inability to
reconcile the principle of self-determination with the equally
important principle of territorial integrity, and with the need to
preserve peace in a particular area. Thus, neither the principle of
self-determination, nor that of territorial integrity, is absolute.
The preference of one over the other depends on the
circumstances of each case.
This Article focuses on whether the right of self-
determination of peoples includes a right of secession under the
law, and whether such a right justifies Biafra's secession from
Nigeria. Part II provides a historical and political background of
the Nigeria conflict, and recounts the events that led to Biafra's
declaration of independence and subsequent secession. Part III
introduces the principle of self-determination and explores the
varying interpretations that have contributed to the principle's
complexity, thus frustrating its uniform application.
Part IV analyzes the principle of self-determination in
international law, offering a comparison of the principle between
and within several international instruments. Part IV also seeks to
reconcile the apparent discrepancies in the guarantee of the right
of self-determination. Part V examines the legality of Biafra's
secession from Nigeria pursuant to international law.
This Article concludes that Biafra's unilateral secession from
Nigeria was legally justified because: (1) Biafra had a historical
claim to independence; (2) there were gross human rights
violations against Biafrans; and (3) the Nigerian government
discriminated against and failed to represent the Biafrans.
II. BACKGROUND
A people who are threatened with extermination and are
cabined and confined within unreasonable limits in a country to
which they are supposed to belong cannot be said to be
enjoying self-determination. Such a group may exercise self-
determination up to the point of secession if they are able and
willing to do so. The justification for this extreme step rests
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both on the denial of human rights and the dim prospects for
their future development. 1
On May 30, 1967, Biafra, the Eastern region of Nigeria,
unilaterally declared its independence. Biafra's declaration came
after a series of complicated political upheavals that led to the
death of many Biafrans. Factors precipitating Biafra's separation
from Nigeria included oppression, injustice, and Biafra's historical
claim to independence. A series of massacres and the expulsion of
East Nigerians from regions other than East Nigeria catalyzed this
movement.
A. The Terrorization of Eastern Nigeria
In terms of both human and material resources consumed, the
conflict between Nigeria and Biafra has been described as one of
the most devastating, serious, and intense crises in Africa.2 The
genesis of this crisis was the fragile and unilateral amalgamation of
the Northern and Southern protectorates of the Niger area by the
British in 1914. 3 The British carried out this merger for the
purpose of administrative convenience. 4 Before and after this
unification, Britain had different administrative structures to the
east, west, and worth of the Niger, which resulted in the
emergence of three separate governments. 5 This gave rise to a
pluralistic society, including over 250 ethnic groups, comprised
mainly of the Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo peoples.
6
Nigerians are a unique ethnic group as most Nigerians do not
share significant commonalities. Hugh Clifford, a former British
Governor General to Nigeria, observed that Nigerians exist in a
"collection of self-contained and mutually independent Native
1. UMOZURIKE OJI UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
269 (1972).
2. Okwudiba Nnoli, The Nigeria-Biafra Conflict: A Political Analysis, in NIGERIA:
DILEMMA OF NATIONHOOD 118 (Joseph Okpaku ed., 1972).
3. See K. W. J. Post, Is There a Case for Biafra?, 44 INT'L AFF. 26, 27-28 (1968); see
also M. G. Kaladharan Nayar, Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial Context: Biafra in
Retrospect, 10 Tex. Int'l L. J. 321,324 (1975) (quoting A. Nwankwo & Ifejika, The Making
of A Nation: Biafra 30 (1969)); Nayar, supra note 3, at 324 (quoting A. NWANKWO &
IFEJIKA, THE MAKING OF A NATION: BIAFRA 30 (1969)).
4. See Tekena N. Tamuno, Separatist Agitations in Nigeria Since 1914, 8 J. MOD.
AFR. STUD. 563,565 (1970).
5. Id. at 565-66.
6. Nayar, supra note 3, at 325-26.
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States, separated from one another ... by vast distances, by
differences of history and traditions, and by ethnological, racial,
tribal, political, social and religious barriers. '' 7 Similarly, Obafemi
Awolowo, former Premier of West Nigeria, and one time federal
Minister of Finance, stated:
Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression.
There are no "Nigerians" in the same sense as there are
"English," Welsh," or "French." The word "Nigerian" is
merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live
within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not.8
The first Prime Minister of Nigeria, Abubakar Tafawa
Balewa, stated, "Since the amalgamation of the Southern and
Northern provinces in 1914, Nigeria has existed as one country
only on paper. It is still far from being united." 9 Even at that
time, the Hausa-Fulani-dominant North opposed the
amalgamation and threatened to secede from the union.10 The
former Premier of Northern Nigeria, Sir Ahmadu Bello noted:
Lord Lugard and his amalgamation were far from popular
amongst us at that time. There were agitations in favour of
secession; we should set up on our own; we should cease to have
anything more to do with the Southern people, we should take
our own way. 1
1
The Northerners preferred a separate country of their own
and wanted nothing to do with the Southerners.12 The British,
however, did not consider the peoples' wishes in their decision to
unify Nigeria. The forced union of North and South resulted in
various separatist agitations from several parts of the country. 13
For instance, at the 1950 Ibadan Constitutional Conference to
review the Richard's Constitution of 1946, the Northern delegates,
led by the Emir of Zaria, threatened to secede from Nigeria unless
the North received control of fifty percent of the seats at the
7. Id. at 324 (quoting Hugh Clifford in F. SCHWARZ, NIGERIA: THE TRIBES, THE
NATION, OR THE RACE-THE POLITICS OF INDEPENDENCE 3 (1965)).
8. Id. at 325-26.
9. Id. at 324.
10. See Tamuno, supra note 4, at 565.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 568.
13. Id. at 567.
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central Legislature. 14  The Northern delegates threatened
secession despite the earlier agreement at the committee stage of
the conference that the seats should be shared at a ratio of 45:33:33
for the Northern, Western and Eastern provinces, respectively. 15
Consequently, the British government conceded "parity of
representation in the Nigerian Representative Council' 6 to the
North.
In April 1953, the Northerners threatened to secede again
following a self-government debate in the House of
Representatives. 17 During the debate, the North ordered that
Nigeria be granted independence "as soon as practicable.' 18
Because of this motion, the joint session of the Northern House of
Assembly and the Northern House of Chiefs passed an eight-point
program providing for a virtually independent regional
government. 19 Endorsed by the North, this eight-point program
confined the central government in the city of Lagos to function as
"a non-political executive agency which would administer only
external defense, foreign affairs, customs, and the West African
Research Institute." 20
Following this crisis, however, the Colonial Secretary invited
all the delegates to London to further discuss revising the
Constitution.21 An additional controversy ensued over whether
Lagos should be characterized a "no-man's land," as suggested and
supported by the East and the North, or whether it was an integral
part of the Western region, as insisted by the West.22 The Western
region delegates, through their leader Awolowo, threatened to
secede if Lagos was not made part of the West.23
In 1962, the country plunged into another quagmire following
a leadership crisis in the Nigerian government that led to the
imposition of a state of emergency in the Western region by the
14. Id. at 568.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. VIVA ONA BARTKUS, THE DYNAMIC OF SECESSION 103 (1999).
20. Id.
21. Tamuno, supra note 4, at 568-69.
22. Id. at 569.
23. Id. at 570.
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Northern-controlled federal government.24 The country almost
disintegrated after an unpopular candidate in the Western region,
with the support of the central government, maneuvered himself
into power and became Premier. 25  This development
strengthened the Western region's resentment towards the
government.
26
Controversy threatened Nigerian unity again when 1963
census projected that the country's population had reached 55.6
million.27 The National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC),
with its principal support base in the Eastern region, accused the
Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) of over-inflating the Northern
region's figures.28 Each of the regions made similar allegations
against one another.29 This bitterness created tension that shook
the very foundation of the country. 30
While the tension over these events was still high, Nigeria
plunged into yet another crisis that continued to threaten its
unification. The root of this crisis was the December 1964 federal
election.31 Vote rigging, kidnapping, and murder marred this
election.32  As a result, the Southern parties boycotted the
election.33 Additionally, Dr. Michael Okpara, the leader of the
NCNC, openly expressed the Eastern region's desire to secede
from the federation.34 In the election aftermath, Nigeria's then-
President, Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe, was forced to state in a nationwide
broadcast:
[I]t is better for us and for our admirers' [sic] abroad that we
should disintegrate in peace and not in pieces. Should the
politicians fail to heed this warning, then I will venture the
prediction that the experience of the democratic Republic of
24. A. Ikoku, Proclamation of the Republic of Biafra, 6 I.L.M. 665,666 (1967).
25. Id.
26. See id
27. Tamuno, supra note 4, at 574.
28. Id.
29. Id
30. Id.
31. Ikoku, supra note 24, at 666.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Tamuno, supra note 4, at 574.
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the Congo will be child's play if it ever comes to our turn to play
such a tragic role.
35
The central government's manipulation of the Western region
election of October 11, 1965 also threatened Nigerian unity.36 The
central government installed a "puppet government" that existed
only at the will of the Northern and Central governments.
37
Consequently, this enraged the Western electorate and led to a
riot that caused a complete breakdown of law and order in the
region.3
8
Nigeria was in a state of chaos. On January 15, 1966, young
army officers, filled with patriotic zeal and the hope of preventing
the nation from drifting toward disaster, took over the government
in a military coup.39 This military coup d'etat ushered in the
regime of Major General Aguiyi Ironsi, an Ibo, as the Head of
State.40 The new regime of Major General Ironsi promulgated
Decree 34 of 1966, which abolished the federal government
structure and introduced a unitary system of government.41 The
Western media, however, used propaganda to incite Northerners,
who perceived the coup as a "plot designed" by the Ibos to destroy
them and dominate the entire country.42 In turn, this paranoia
proved to be disastrous for the Easterners.
In retaliation, on May 29, 1966, the Northerners massacred
thousands of Easterners living in the Northern region.
43
Consequently, this prompted the central government to set up an
inquiry tribunal to investigate the cause of the unprovoked
killings.44 The Northerners, however, through their emirs, vowed
not to appear before the tribunal and threatened to secede if
forced to do so.
On July 29, 1966, exactly two months after the massacres,
Northern army officers responded to the coup and organized
35. Id.
36. See Ikoku, supra note 24, at 666-67.
37. Id. at 666.
38. Id. at 665-67.
39. Post, supra note 3, at 29.
40. Ikoku, supra note 24, at 667.
41. Nayar, supra note 3, at 322.
42. Nnoli, supra note 2, at 21; see also BARTKUS, supra note 19, at 121-22.
43. See Ikoku, supra note 24, at 667; see also BARTKUS, supra note 19, at 122.
44. Ikoku, supra note 24, at 667.
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another pogrom against the peoples of the Eastern region.45
Major General Ironsi, along with several other military officers of
the Eastern region, was killed in the uprising.46  This time,
however, both Northern soldiers and civilians took part in the
killings. 47 Yakubu Gowon, the new Head of State, together with
the leaders of the coup, initially demanded freedom to withdraw
the North from Nigeria. 48 In Gowon's first nationwide broadcast,
upon assuming office on August 1, 1966, he noted that "putting all
considerations to test, political, economic as well as social, the
basis for unity is not there, or is so badly rocked not only once but
several times. I therefore feel that we should review the issue of
our national standing."
49
On September 29, 1966, another pogrom took place against
Eastern Nigerians living outside the East Nigerian region.50 A riot
in the Northern region triggered the killings. Those responsible
were disappointed that the North had not seceded and resented
the idea of further involvement of the North with other parts of
Nigeria.51 Between May and October, over 50,000 Easterners lost
their lives, several thousands were maimed, and over two million
fled from other parts of Nigeria back to the East.
52
The Easterners perceived the May, July, and September
massacres as a deliberate plan, supported by the federal
government, to eliminate them.53 They believed the massacres
were premeditated acts because they all occurred on the twenty-
ninth day of the month.54  Furthermore, the Northerners'
violations of the Easterners' human rights went unpunished and
uninvestigated. 55
45. Id.; see also BARTKUS, supra note 19, at 122.
46. Ikoku, supra note 24, at 667.
47. Id.
48. Charles R. Nixon, Self-Determinatiorn The Nigeria/Biafra Case, 24 WORLD POL.
473,477 (1972).
49. Yakubu Gowon, Address to Nigerians (Aug. 1, 1966), in LEE C. BUCHHEIT,
SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 165-66 (1978).
50. Ikoku, supra note 24, at 668; see also Nnoli, supra note 2, at 118.
51. Nixon, supra note 48, at 478.
52. Nnoli, supra note 2, at 121-22.
53. Id- at 476.
54. Ikoku, supra note 24, at 668.
55. Nixon, supra note 48, at 476.
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B. Biafra's Decision to Declare Its Independence
Despite all the atrocities committed against the Easterners,
the leadership of the Eastern region continued to make very
serious efforts toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict. 56 The
federal government, however, continued to frustrate these
efforts.57 For example, the federal government did not fully
implement the decision of the Representatives of Military
Governors meeting in Lagos to repatriate troops to their region of
origin. 58  Furthermore, on September 12, 1966, an ad hoc
Constitutional Conference was convened to determine ways of
resolving the crisis peacefully. 59  The conference consisted of
delegates from the various governments of the regions. At the
conference, the original memorandum submitted by the Northern
region included, inter alia "the right of any State within the
country to secede." 60 Similarly, the original memorandum of the
Western region specified, inter alia, "[e]ach state should have a
right unilaterally to secede from the Commonwealth at any time of
its own choice." 61 Although both regions, through the persuasion
of the Western countries, dropped the issue of secession in their
later memoranda, these original memoranda clearly demonstrated
that the right to secede had popular support in these regions. 62
Nevertheless, Gowon later unilaterally dismissed the Conference
when the delegates were on the verge of recommending a loose
form of association between the various regions of the country. 63
As a result of these threats to the lives, property, and
leadership of the Easterners, no venue could be secured in Nigeria
56. BARTKUS, supra note 19, at 121.
57. See Nixon, supra note 48, at 477; see also Ikoku, supra note 24, at 669.
58. See Ikoku, supra note 24, at 669; see also Nixon, supra note 48, at 477.
59. Ilkoku, supra note 24, at 669; see also BARTKUS, supra note 19, at 122;
BUCHHEIT, supra note 49, at 166.
60. Nixon, supra note 48, at 478 (quoting Paper by the Northern Nigeria Delegation,
to the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference (Sept. 12, 1966) printed in Ad Hoc Conference
on the Nigerian Constitution, NIGERIAN CRISIS 1966, at 3-4 (1966) [hereinafter NIGERIAN
CRISIS]); see also BARTKUS, supra note 19, at 122; Ikoku, supra note 24, at 669.
61. Nixon, supra note 48, at 478 (quoting Memorandum by the Western Nigeria and
Lagos Delegations, to Ad Hoc Committee on Constitutional Arrangements for Nigeria
(1966) printed in NIGERIAN CRISIS, supra note 60, at 26 (1966)); see also BARTKUS, supra
note 19, at 122.
62. BARTKUS, supra note 19, at 122.
63. Ikoku, supra note 24, at 670.
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for future meetings on how to resolve the crisis. 64 Eventually, the
parties agreed to a two-day meeting at Aburi in Ghana beginning
January 4, 1967.65 Government representatives of the various
regions and the federal government attended the meeting. The
representatives decided that the country should adopt a confederal
system of government. 66 However, the federal government again
refused to implement such a system.
67
Faced with inaction once again, the Eastern Region
Consultative Assembly, put in place by the Richard Constitution
of 1946,68 convened on August 31, 1966 to consider alternative
ways to handle the crisis.69 The Assembly consisted of 335
members from the various provinces that made up the region.70
One hundred and sixty-five members were from non-Ibo minority
groups. 71 Beginning on August 31, 1966, the Assembly met
periodically to assess the situation and to recommend an
appropriate response to the conflict.7
2
On May 26, 1967, the Assembly met at Enugu and passed a
resolution mandating the Governor of the region, Colonel
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, to declare the Eastern region
an independent sovereign state by the name of Biafra at the
"earliest practicable date." 73  Acting on the mandate of the
peoples' representatives, Ojukwu declared the Eastern region a
sovereign independent state on May 30, 1967.74 By this time, the
Eastern region had exhausted all peaceful avenues toward
resolving the conflict. Consequently, on July 5, 1967, the federal
government of Nigeria responded by declaring war on Biafra.75
64. Id. at 669.
65. Id
66. Nixon, supra note 48, at 477.
67. Id
6& Id. at 481.
69. See Ikoku, supra note 24, at 670.
70. Nayar, supra note 3, at 326.
71. Id.
72. Nixon, supra note 48, at 479.
73. Id. at 479-80.
74. Id at 475.
75. Id at 476.
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III. THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION
Approximately 150 national liberation groups,76 comprised of
indigenous peoples and minorities alike, have articulated their
grievances through varying degrees of the exercise of self-
determination. 77  For those seeking complete autonomy, the
results have varied. For example, in 1971, Bangladesh successfully
seceded from Pakistan through the assertion of self-determination.
To contrast, Biafra's similar attempt to secede from Nigeria
failed. 7
8
Individuals must choose to assert the right of self-
determination through a free and genuine expression of their
will.79 Moreover, the exercise of this right must be without outside
interference or any form of undue influence. Self-determination is
defined as "the right of each people or nation [freely] without
outside pressure, to determine their state affiliation, including the
right to forming an independent state, and also to determine the
forms of their internal political, economic, social and cultural life,
which is guaranteed by international organisations and bodies. '' 80
One purpose of self-determination is to remove a group from
the political domination of another group, thus allowing the
removed group to control its own destiny. 81 Self-determination, as
a human right, creates an obligation to be observed in relation to
peoples in dependent and independent states. 82 Although self-
determination is described as "the realization of greater respect for
human rights," 83 it is perplexing that the principle has no
commonly accepted definition in international law fora. 84
76. S. Sathananthan, Tamil-Eelamr" Right to Self-Determination, at
http://www.tamilnation.org/seifdetermination/ 990321satha.htm. (Mar. 22-23, 1999).
77. See Thornberry, supra note 77, at 868 (citing Indigenous Peoples A Global Quest
for Justice, A Report of the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues
(1987)).
78. See, e.g., D. B. Levin, The Principle of Self-Determination of Nations in
International Law, SOVIET Y.B. INT'L L. 45,46 (1962).
79. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL
REAPPRAISAL 131 (1995).
80. Levin, supra note 78, at 46.
81. W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 182 (1977).
82. See UMOZURIKE, supra note 1, at 52.
83. CASSESE, supra note 79, at 282.
84. R. A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights
Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 4 DUKE L.J. 660,
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Notwithstanding the absence of such a definition, "[i]mpetus has
been given to the advancement of the principle of self-
determination of peoples as a legal right in recent times by its
inclusion in the U.N. Charter where it is referred to rather than
defined. ' 85 Despite the inclusion of the principle in the U.N.
Charter and other international instruments,86 a controversy
remains as to the principle's meaning because none of these
instruments adequately defines the concept.
Descriptions of self-determination vary in content.
87
Publicists and political leaders define the concept in various ways
based on their individual perceptions. For example, former U.S.
President Woodrow Wilson, the man credited for popularizing the
concept of self-determination, identified it as "the right of every
people to choose the sovereign under which they live, to be free of
alien masters, and not to be handed about from sovereign to
sovereign as if they were property." 88 Implicit in this articulation
of self-determination is the doctrine of popular sovereignty.
Under this doctrine, a government is based on the will of the
people, not that of a monarch: "People not content with their
government should be able to secede and organize themselves as
they wish."' 89 President Wilson believed that all people should
663 (1990) [hereinafter Williams, Indigenous Peoples' Survival] (citing Hurst Hannum,
New Developments in Indigenous Rights, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 649 (1988) [hereinafter
Hannum, New Developments]).
85. H. M. KINDRED ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND
APPLIED IN CANADA 54 (6th ed., Edmond Montgomery Publication Ltd. 2000)
[hereinafter KINDRED, INTERNATIONAL LAW].
86. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2, art. 55, para 1; see also International Covenants on
Civil and Political Rights, (1966) art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 173; OAU Ministerial Meeting on
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, arts. 19-20, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (Jan. 7-19, 1981) (also known as the Banjul Charter), reprinted in
21 I.L.M. 58, 59 (1982) [hereinafter African Charter]; Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th
Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 340-43, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration on
Friendly Relations].
87. Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Self-Determination and the Struggle for Ethno-Cultural
Autonomy in Nigeria: The Zangon-Kataf and Ogoni Problems, 6 AFR. SOC'Y INT'L L. 88,
90 (1994).
88. Deborah Z. Cass, Rethinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current
International Law Theories, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 21, 23-24 (1992).
89. John Howard Clinebell & Jim Thomson, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The
Rights of Native Americans Under International Law, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 669, 701 (1977-78)
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have the right to choose their form of government.90 Self-
determination encompasses five basic characteristics:
(1) government according to the will of the people; (2) the absence
of internal or external domination; (3) the free pursuit of
economic, social, and cultural development; (4) the enjoyment of
fundamental human rights; and (5) the absence of discrimination
on grounds of race, color, or political conviction.91 This approach
embraces the external and internal aspects of self-determination.
Peoples can gain their independence and separate from the
oppressor state. 92 It also recognizes the rights of minority and
majority groups within the state to be free from domination by
each other.
Customarily, international law has acknowledged self-
determination as an inalienable fundamental human right. As
observed by the United Kingdom Permanent Representative to
the United Nations in 1983, "[s]elf-determination is usually
referred to these days in the United Nations not as a principle, but
rather as an 'inalienable right' in other words, it is a right which
cannot be taken away. This right is derived principally from the
U.N. Charter and the Covenants on Human Rights." 93
Consequently, the right of self-determination is tantamount to
the right of freedom from alien oppressors, tyranny, totalitarian
governments, and any other form of subjugation.94  It is
characterized as the "condition and the cornerstone of exercising
all the other rights and enjoying all other human rights." 95 Self-
determination is further predicated on the right of peoples to
[hereinafter Clinebell & Thomson] (citing J. SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT
OF SELF-DETERMINATION 17 (1973)).
90. THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 2 (R. Baker & W. Dodd eds. 1926),
cited in Clinebell & Thomson, supra note 89, at 702.
91. See UMOZURIKE, supra note 1, at 71.
92. GRIGORII IVANOVICH TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (William
E. Butler trans., 1974), (citing Lenin, Sotsialisticheskaia Revoliutsiia i Pravo Natsii Na
Samoopredelenie, 27 Polnoe Sobranie So Chinenii 255).
93. Letter from Sir Anthony Parsons, U.K. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations in New York, to the President of the Security Council (Apr. 28, 1982), in Geoffrey
Marston, United Kingdom Materials on International Law 1983, 1984 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
361, 396 [hereinafter Parsons Letter].
94. W. OFUTAEY-KODOJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 182 (1977).
95. Alexandre Kiss, The Peoples' Right to Self-Determination, 7 HUM. RTS. L.J. 165,
174 (1986).
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control their destiny, and to liberate themselves from all forms of
oppression, domination, subjugation, and any acts that violate
their human rights. The concept of self-determination as an ideal
is considered relevant to all peoples by the international
community and is referenced in several instruments of
international law, including the U.N. Charter.
IV. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS GUARANTEE THE RIGHT OF
SELF-DETERMINATION
A. The U.N. Charter
After World War II, the principle of self-determination was
reintroduced into international dialogue through the text of the
U.N. Charter.96 The principle is pronounced in Articles 1(2) and
55 of the U.N. Charter,97 as well as in chapters XI and XII.98
Article 1(2) asserts that the purpose of the United Nations is
"[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and
to take appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." 99
Article 55 provides that the United Nations shall promote
"universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex
language, or religion." 100 In Article 56, the U.N. Charter creates
an obligation for member states to cooperate in perpetuating
respect for fundamental freedoms. 101 Moreover, members have
accepted this obligation by ratifying the U.N. Charter in their
respective territories.
Self-determination, as reflected in the U.N. Charter, embraces
the right of peoples to be free from subjugation and includes the
96. See OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 81, at 154.
97. Tom M. Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in PEOPLES
AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (Catherine Brolmann, et al. eds., The
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993).
98. George Steven Swan, Self-Determination and the United Nations Charter, 22
INDIAN J. INT'L L. 264,266 (1982).
99. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
100. Id. art. 55.
101. "All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." U.N.
CHARTER art. 56.
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people's right to establish a regime of their own liking.10 2 The
report of the rapporteur to the drafting Commission of the U.N.
Charter supports this position:
It was understood; that the principle of equal rights of people
and that of self-determination are two component elements of
one norm. That the respect of the norm is a basis for the
development of friendly relations, and is in effect, one of the
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace. It was
understood likewise that the principle in question, as a
provision of the [U.N.] Charter, should be considered in
function of other provisions. That an essential element of the
principle in question is a free and genuine expression of the will
of the people; and thus to avoid cases like those alleged by
Germany and Italy. That the principle as one whole extends as
a general basic conception to a possible amalgamation of
nationalities if they so freely chose.1
03
The rapporteur's statement is authoritative in interpreting the
meaning and content of the principle of self-determination. The
U.N. Charter also accepts self-determination as a component of
group human rights,104 and as a human rights issue of universal
application. 1
05
Consequently, self-determination, as promised in the U.N.
Charter, is a claimable right of all subjected peoples or
communities. 10 6 The right is not limited to the categories of
groups specified in Chapters XI and XII of the U.N. Charter.
10 7
Instead, all peoples whose rights have been subjugated in violation
of international law can invoke the right of self-determination.
The language of the U.N. Charter implies that peoples can secede
from the parent state in exercising their right of self-
determination. 10 8 The special rapporteur of the Subcommission
102. See generally U.N. CHARTER.
103. UMOZURIKE, supra note 1, at 46 (citing Summary Report of Committee I/I, Doc.
I/I/I of May 16, 1945, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 296).
104. See U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
105. See id
106. See OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 81, at 181.
107. Id at 128.
108. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340-43. "A state that
subjugates any part of its people in violation of international law cannot be representing
such people without discrimination and as such cannot be said to have complied with the
provisions of this paragraph." Id.; see also Re Reference by the Governor In Council
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on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
observes:
The principle of equal rights and self determination, as laid
down in the Charter of the United Nations, does not grant an
unlimited right of secession to populations living in the territory
of an independent sovereign state, and such a right cannot be
regarded as a provision of lex lata. The right of secession
unquestionably exists, however, in a special, but very important
case: that of peoples, territories, and entities subjugated in
violation of international law. In such cases, the peoples
concerned have the right to regain their freedom and constitute
themselves independent Sovereign States.
109
B. U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 1514(XV)
and 1541 (XV)
On December 14 and 15, 1960, the General Assembly of the
United Nations adopted Resolutions 1514(XV) 110 (Resolution
1514) and 1541(XV) 111 (Resolution 1541). The primary objective
of these resolutions was the final and complete liberation of
people still under colonial rule."
2
Resolution 1514 reaffirms faith in the U.N. Charter's
commitment to the principles of fundamental human rights and
equality of nations, irrespective of size. 113  According to
Resolution 1514, dependent peoples must be liberated from the
bondage of colonialism. Resolution 1514 warns that denying
peoples their right to self-determination may threaten world
Concerning Certain Questions Relating to the Secession of Quebec from Canada, [1998]
D.L.R. 4th 385,439-42 [hereinafter Reference re: Secession of Quebec].
109. Michael K. Addo, Political Self Determination within the Context of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 32 J. AFR. L. 182, 191-92 (1988) (citing A.
Cristescu, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Right to Self-Determination: Historical
and Current Development on the Basis of United Nations Instruments (1981), 1 173, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/sub/2/404/Rev.1).
110. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, 2, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960)
[hereinafter Resolution 1514].
111. Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A.
Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, art. 1, 2, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1961) [hereinafter Resolution 1541].
112. UMOZURIKE, supra note 1, at 70.
113. Id.
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peace 114 and provides seven principles 115 to assist in rapidly
eradicating colonial rule.
Paragraph 2 of Resolution 1514 affirms the right of colonial
peoples to determine their destiny freely. The notion that the
people are not mature enough for self-government is outmoded
and unacceptable. 116 Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1514, however,
seems to limit the guarantee of this right. 117 This limitation raises
the crucial question of whether the principle of territorial integrity
limits the right of self-determination in the decolonization
process. 118
The principle of territorial integrity in paragraph 6 of
Resolution 1514 prevents the dismemberment of colonial
territories prior to gaining their independence." 9 A colonial
power is prohibited from severing the wealthiest part of a non-self-
governing territory before granting independence to those less
viable. 120 The preparatory work of the drafting committee bears
testimony to this fact. 121 During the drafting of paragraph 6,
"many delegates construed the paragraph as a prohibition against
the dismemberment of non-self-governing units by the
administering power prior to independence.' 122 The General
Assembly of the United Nations condemned the actions of the
United Kingdom as a violation of paragraph 6 when the United
Kingdom detached the British Indian Ocean territories from the
colonies of Mauritius and Seychelles before granting the colonies
independence. 123
It appears that the principle of territorial integrity was
intended "to preserve the unity of a territory soon to become
114. Id.
115. Id. at 71.
116. Resolution 1514, supra note 110, at 67. "All peoples have a right to self-
determination: by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development." Id.
117. Id. "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and
the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations." Id.
118. S. K. N. Blay, Self-Determination Versus Territorial Integrity in Decolonization, 18
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 441,442 (1986).
119. Id at 445-46.
120. Id. at 446.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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independent in order to enable it to exercise self-determination as
a single unit. ' 124 The principle of territorial integrity, however,
was not intended to preclude people within a sovereign state from
exercising their right to self-determination through secession.
125
This is evident because Resolution 1514 applies only to people
living within a colonial territory.
126
The process of implementing self-determination is specified in
Resolution 1541. As provided in principle VI of Resolution 1541,
a non-self-governing territory could achieve self-government by:
(a) emergence as a sovereign independent State; (b) free
association with an independent State; or (c) integration with an
independent State.127 When a colonial territory chose to become
independent, it was not necessary to ascertain the wishes of the
people by means of a popular vote.128 Perhaps the rationale was
that this mode of exercising the right of self-determination was not
prone to manipulation by the colonial power.
If a colonial territory is associated with an independent state,
Resolution 1541 demands that such association be the result of a
free and voluntary choice of the people, as expressed through an
informed and democratic process. 129 In the case of integration
with an independent state, however, the exercise of the right of
self-determination must follow a process. Specifically, the exercise
must be the result of freely expressed wishes of the territory's
people acting with full knowledge of the change in their status.
Their wishes must be expressed through informed and democratic
processes impartially conducted and based on universal adult
suffrage. When deemed necessary, the United Nations could
supervise these processes. 130
The purpose of this stringent process of integration was to
allow those under colonial rule to appreciate their new status after
integration. It was likely used to avoid a situation where the
administering power could exploit and manipulate the people
based on their lack of education.
124. Id. at 447.
125. See Nayar, supra note 3, at 338.
126. See Resolution 1514, supra note 110, at 66.
127. Resolution 1541, supra note 111, at 29.
128. CASSESE, supra note 79, at 73.
129. ld
130. Resolution 1541,supra note 111, at 30.
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Many colonial territories have achieved full self-government
through the use of Resolutions 1514 and 1541. These two
resolutions, however, apply only to peoples under colonial
bondage, and not to citizens of sovereign independent states.
C. The International Covenants of 1966
In 1966, the United Nations adopted the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 131 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights132
(collectively, International Covenants). The International
Covenants came into effect in 1976, guaranteeing the right of self-
determination.
133
Article 1 of the International Covenants provides that "all
peoples have the right of self-determination. 134 By virtue of this
right, they may freely determine their political status and pursue
their economic, social, and cultural development.' 1 35 Article 1
further provides that "[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant,
including those having responsibility for the administration of
Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the
realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that
right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations."' 136 Pursuant to these International Covenants,
the right of self-determination enables peoples to establish their
political status freely. The International Covenants also
incorporate internal and external aspects of the right. The
external aspect embraces the right of a nation to be free from
external influence or domination. 137 The internal aspect embodies
the right to participate in the democratic process in "one's own
131. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
art. 1,993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5 [hereinafter International Economic Covenant].
132. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter International Civil Covenant].
133. International Economic Covenant, supra note 131, at 5; International Civil
Covenant, supra note 132, at 173.
134. International Economic Covenant, supra note 131, at 5; International Civil
Covenant, supra note 132, at 173.
135. International Economic Covenant, supra note 131, at 5; International Civil
Covenant, supra note 132, at 173.
136. International Economic Covenant, supra note 131, at 5; International Civil
Covenant, supra note 132, at 173.
137. Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 25 n.105
(1993) [hereinafter Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination].
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government. ' 138 Additionally, by guaranteeing self-determination
as a group human right, both articles "safeguard human rights."
139
The right of self-determination in Article 1 of the
International Covenants is available to all people regardless of
whether they are in colonial bondage or living in metropolitan
states. The preparatory documents give credence to this
assertion. 140 During the debate at the Third Committee, delegates
of several countries indicated that they understood "all peoples" to
embrace not only those in a colonial situation but also those living
in sovereign independent states. 141 Furthermore, "the view of the
working party that submitted the final draft to the Third
Committee in 1955" provides further support that "all peoples"
has a broad interpretation. 142 Before submitting the final draft,
the working party changed the words "and all nations" used in the
original draft prepared by the Commission on Human Rights, to
"all peoples." 143 The Soviet Union delegate protested this change,
contending the original draft "better [expressed] the fundamental
principle of self-determination."' 144 Despite this opposition, the
working party declared that the term "peoples" included nations
and other groups, consistent with the spirit and intent of the
original draft by the Commission on Human Rights.
145
The general spirit and content of Article 1, combined with the
preparatory work, demonstrates that Article 1 applies to: '(1)
entire populations living in independent and sovereign states, (2)
entire populations of territories that have yet to attain
independence, and (3) populations living under foreign military
occupation. "146 Robert McCorquodale, a distinguished
commentator, however, held a somewhat different view. In his
opinion, "[A]rticle 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and state practice reject the notion that peoples
can only be defined as all the inhabitants of a state-hence the
138. Id.
139. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 2, Jan. 11, 1992,
31 I.L.M. 1497, 1498.
140. Addo, supra note 109, at 186.
141. Id. at 187.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. CASSESE, supra note 79, at 59.
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application of the right of self-determination to noncolonial
territories." 147 Demonstrating yet another view, the Supreme
Court of Canada, in the recent Quebec Secession case held:
It is clear that "a people" may include only a portion of the
population of an existing state. The right to self-determination
has developed largely as a human right, and is generally used in
documents that simultaneously contain references to "nation"
and "state". The juxtaposition of these terms is indicative that
the reference to "people" does not necessarily mean the
entirety of a state's population. To restrict the definition of the
term to the population of the existing states would render the
granting of a right to self-determination largely duplicative,
given the parallel emphasis within the majority of the source
documents on the need to protect the territorial integrity of
existing states, and would frustrate its remedial purpose.1
48
The right, as reflected in the International Covenants, belongs to
all people, and there is no distinction between those under colonial
rule and those in a sovereign independent state.149 Specifically,
"The duty to 'promote the realization of the right of self-
determination' is imposed upon all states parties and not merely
upon colonial powers."'
150
Consequently, the right to self-determination under the
International Covenants is a continuing right that does not end
with achieving independence. 151 States are under an obligation to
comply with Article 1 of the International Covenants at all times
by respecting the peoples' right to self-determination. 152 This
position is reinforced by the "western view that... self-
determination ought to be considered a universal right to which
147. Robert McCorquodale, Human Rights and Self-Determination, in THE NEW
WORLD ORDER: SOVEREIGNTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF
PEOPLES 9 (Mortimer Sellers ed., 1994).
148. Reference re: Secession of Quebec, supra note 108, at 437.
149. Nayar, supra note 3, at 334.
150. Id. (citing G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6136
(1996); see also Kiss, supra note 95, at 174. "It also results from the inclusion of the right
to self-determination in the Covenants that this right is to be applied all over the world, by
all the States parties the Covenants, in all situations, not only to colonies, occupied
territories, or to South Africa." Id.
151. CASSESE, supra note 79, at 54-55.
152. Id. at 55.
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the people of the independent and sovereign States were
entitled. "153
Under this interpretation, dependent territories can
"freely... decide their international status," either by forming a
new state or by associating or integrating with an existing
sovereign state.154  Similarly, peoples under a sovereign
independent state can secede or separate from their parent state.
The position of some countries during the debate regarding
inclusion of self-determination in the International Covenants
bears testimony to this view. For example, the delegates from
New Zealand argued, "if self-determination was intended to be
recognized as a right, the right should be commensurate with the
principle and should include the right of secession. 155 Similarly,
Australia posited that Article 1 would allow minorities to
determine their own status freely. 156
During the debates, both the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom contended that "self-determination of peoples" implies
not only the right of colonies to become independent, but also the
right of groups within existing states to secede or separate. 157
According to the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, if self-
determination does not include the right to secession, then
Articles 1(1) of both Covenants on Human Rights would be
rendered meaningless, since "each confers the right of self-
determination on 'all peoples,' and makes no distinction between
colonial peoples and ethnic minorities within a state. ' 158 It is
clear, therefore, that the right of self-determination guaranteed by
the International Covenants has universal application. Colonial
people, as well as those in sovereign independent states, can
invoke the right.
153. Id. at 109.
154. Id at 57-58.
155. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm. 10th Sess. 649th mtg., Agenda Item 28, 1 9, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.649 (1955).
156. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 10th Sess., 647th mtg., Agenda Item 28, j 23, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.647 (1955).
157. Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, supra note 137, at 24 n.98.
158. Nayar, supra note 3, at 341.
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D. The Declaration on Friendly Relations
In 1970, at its 25th anniversary session, the General Assembly
of the United Nations put forth the Declaration on Friendly
Relations (Declaration), 159 which affirms the principles of self-
determination. 160 The Declaration provides a broad right of self-
determination, which is framed in such a manner as to outlast its
application in the "dismantling of colonialism.' ' 161 Furthermore,
when "implementing the principle, a people are free to determine
the political status that best suits their circumstantial demands.'
'162
Although the Declaration is a resolution of the U.N. General
Assembly, the Declaration has binding legal force. First, the
Declaration is an authoritative interpretation of the U.N. Charter;
it was not intended to set up new norms, only to elaborate on the
meaning of the existing U.N. Charter norms. 163 The Declaration
has been "described as the most important single statement
representing what the members of the United Nations agree to be
the law of the U.N. Charter on the seven principles with which it
deals."'164 Second, the Declaration is a product of "consensus in
the Special Committee" that drafted it, and the U.N. General
Assembly unanimously adopted it.165 Arguably, "the Declaration
constitutes an opinio juris sufficient for the establishment of a
customary rule of international law." 166  Finally, the preamble
clearly expresses the Declaration's intent to be binding. 1
67
Paragraph 1 of the Declaration states:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all
159. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340-43.
160. C. D. Johnson, Toward Self-Determination: A Reappraisal as Reflected in the
Declaration on Friendly Relations, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 145, 145 (1973) [hereinafter
Johnson, Self-Determination].
161. Id. at 153.
162. Id.
163. Nayar, supra note 3, at 335 (citing Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 713, 714
(1971)).
164. Id
165. Id
166. C. R. Ezetah, International Law of Self-Determination and the Ogoni Question:
Mirroring Africa's Post-Colonial Dilemma, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L COMP. L. REV. 834 (1997),
noted in Frederic Kirgis, The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations, 88 AM.
J. INT'L L. 304, 306 (1994).
167. Nayar, supra note 3, at 336.
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peoples have the right freely to determine, without external
interference, their political status and to pursue their economic,
social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to
respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter.168
This paragraph guarantees the right of self-determination to
all peoples and imposes a duty on states to respect this right.169 In
paragraph 2, the Declaration reaffirms the duty of every state to
promote the principles of equal rights and self-determination and
"to render assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the
responsibilities entrusted to it by the U.N. Charter regarding the
implementation of the principle. ' 170  All states, colonial or
noncolonial, have the duty to promote the principle of self-
determination. 171 Paragraph 3 of the Declaration imposes a duty
on all states to jointly and separately promote universal respect for
the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 172
Thus, the Declaration provides further support for the principle of
self-determination as a human right.173
The duty imposed on states, however, goes beyond the
colonial context.174 Paragraph 4 of the Declaration sets forth ways
to implement the right of self-determination, analogous to
provision VI of Resolution 1541. These methods include the
establishment of a sovereign and independent state and free
association or integration with independent state. Before
exercising the right of self-determination, the people must come to
a consensus regarding which political status is their ultimate
goal. 175 Unlike Resolution 1541, however, there is no requirement
to use an informed democratic process in order to ascertain the
people's wishes to integrate or associate with the independent
state.1
76
168. Id. (citing Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340-43).
169. See Bereket Habte Selassie, Self-Determination in Principle and Practice: The
Ethiopian-Eritrean Experience, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 91, 97 (1998).
170. Nayar, supra note 3, at 336 (citing Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note
86, at 340-43).
171. Id.
172. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340-43.
173. Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, supra note 137, at 17.
174. Johnson, Self-Determination, supra note 160, at 149.
175. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340-43.
176. CASSESE, supra note 79, at 73.
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Paragraph 5 of the Declaration prohibits states from using
force to deprive peoples of their right to self-determination.
177
The United Kingdom strongly opposed this prohibition during the
debate preceding the drafting of the Declaration.178 The United
Kingdom representatives argued that such a prohibition "could
not be understood as precluding such limited police action as
might be essential to maintain or restore law and order."
179
Several representatives, however, took exception to the United
Kingdom's position and worked assiduously to include paragraph
5 in the final draft of the Declaration.
180
Paragraph 5 prohibits the use of force to deprive peoples of
their right to self-determination. Additionally, Paragraph 5 also
recognizes that "in their actions against and resistance to such
forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-
determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and receive
support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
[U.N.] Charter."181  At the special committee to draft the
Declaration, South Africa's delegate was apprehensive in
accepting the right of peoples to seek and receive assistance from a
third state in their efforts toward liberation. He contended that
states might launch attacks on other states.182  The U.S.
representative, however, clarified the issue by submitting that it
"did not constitute a general license for international traffic in
arms."
183
The crucial question is to what extent a state can afford to
assist people fighting for self-determination. States acting in
compliance with paragraph 5 can give financial and technical
assistance as well as military equipment to peoples fighting self-
determination wars. States can also send troops to aid such
peoples in their liberation efforts. 184 Some commentators contend
that states cannot justifiably send troops to national liberation
movements engaged in self-determination wars.
185
177. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340-43.
178. Johnson, Self-Determination, supra note 160, at 150.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340-43.
182. Johnson, Self-Determination, supra note 160, at 151.
183. ld.
184. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340-43.
185. CASSESE, supra note 79, at 152.
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Although Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter precludes the use
of force against a state's territorial integrity, such protection would
only be available to a state acting in accordance with the principle
of self-determination. "[T]he oppressed people" in exercising
their right could challenge a state that is not acting in accordance
with this principle. In such a case, assistance from troops, pursuant
to Article 56 of the U.N. Charter and paragraph 5 of the
Declaration, does not violate Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, but
furthers the purpose of the United Nations. 186 It is noted that,
"the critical question in a decentralised system is not whether
coercion has been applied but whether it has been applied in
support or against community order and basic policies, and
whether it was applied in ways whose net consequences include
increased congruence with community goals and minimum
order."187
Paragraph 7 is one of the most important provisions of the
Declaration because it makes "a bold attempt to reconcile the
conflict between the principles of self-determination and territorial
integrity of states." 188  Paragraph 7, generally described as a
"safeguard clause," 189 states:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent states conducting
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus
possessed of a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed
or colour.
190
The implication of this provision is that the state's power to invoke
the principle of territorial integrity is contingent upon the
186. Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Self-Determination and the Use of Force in
Contemporary International Law: An African Perspective 248-49 (1994) (unpublished
LL.M. thesis, University of Nigeria, Enugu) (on file with author) [hereinafter Okafor
LL.M. Thesis].
187. W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter
Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L. L. 642, 645 (1984).
188. Nayar, supra note 3, at 337.
189. James Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession, 69
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 85, 113 [1998].
190. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340-43.
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government representing the whole population. 191 In other words,
paragraph 7 made the principle of territorial integrity "a
rebuttable presumption that can only be invoked by states that act
in accordance with the principle of self-determination.' ' 192 "The
logical reading of the Declaration is that a state must possess a
government representing the whole people for it to be entitled to
protection of its territorial integrity against secession." 193
The preparatory documents amply support this
interpretation. For instance, according to the U.S. proposal to the
U.N. Committee on Friendly Relations in 1966, "the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples was of particular
importance since respect for it was indispensable for the existence
of a community of nations in which the other principles could be
respected."'194
The United Kingdom took a similar stance, supported by
many other countries, including Canada, France, Australia, Japan,
and the Netherlands. 195 Although opposition came from other
countries, 196 Italy introduced a compromise:
States enjoying full sovereignty and independence, and
possessed of a government representing the whole of their
population, shall be considered to be conducting themselves in
conformity with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as regards that population. Nothing
in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing
191. Claudia Saladin, Self-Determination, Minority Rights and Constitutional
Accommodation. The Example of Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L.
172, 186 (1991).
192. Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-
Colonial Age, in McCorquodale, supra note 147, at 54.
193. Ved P. Nanda, Revisiting Self-Determination as an International Law Concept: A
Major Challenge in the Post-Cold War Era, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 443,449 (1997).
194. Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States, G.A. Res. 2181 (XXI), U.N. GAOR 6th
Comm., 68th mtg. at 4, 21, U.N. Doc. A/AC.125/SR.68 (1967) [hereinafter Resolution
2181].
195. Resolution 2181, supra note 194, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 69th mtg. at 14, 18,
U.N. Doc.A/AC.125/SR.69 (1967); U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 70th mtg. at 6, U.N.
Doc.A/AC.125/SR.70 (1967); U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 105th mtg. at 53, U.N.
Doc.A/AC.125/SR.105 (1967); U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 106th mtg. at 64, 74, U.N.
Doc.A/AC.125/SR.106 (1967); U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 107th mtg. at 82-85, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.125/SR.107 (1967); see CASSESE, supra note 79, at 115.
196. CASSESE, supra note 79, at 116.
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any action which would impair, totally or in part, the territorial
integrity, or political unity, of such States.197
A further amendment introduced the phrase "without
distinction as to race, creed, or colour."'198 Therefore, the
preparatory work provides eloquent testimony to the
interpretation of paragraph 7 of the Declaration. Additionally,
where a state violates paragraph 3 by failing "to promote respect
for the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms...
that state would not be conducting itself 'in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."
' 199
Consequently, the peoples concerned would be at liberty to
exercise their right of self-determination through secession.
200
Legal commentator, Dr. Obiora Okafor, wrote:
[A] people who have a right against their own government will
do so obviously on the basis that they are exercising their
inalienable right to self-determination. A government, which is
not based on the consent of the governed, can only be
maintained by massive human rights violations and brutal
repressions. Such a government will at best be unrepresentative
and at worst fascist. Such a government is clearly not
conducting itself according to the principle of self-
determination of all peoples. 2° 1
Similarly, acclaimed scholar M.G. Kaladharan Nayar,
asserted, "It further follows from this paragraph that peoples
within a sovereign and independent state may exercise their right
of self-determination, including secession, when the government of
that state does not comply with the principle of equal right and
self-determination of peoples, and therefore, does not represent
the people." 20 2
The Declaration prohibits the use of force against the
territorial integrity of another state in the same manner as Article
2(4) of the U.N. Charter. 20 3 Paragraph 5 of the Declaration, read
in conjunction with paragraph 7, demonstrates that oppressed
197. Id. at 116 (quoting U.N. Doc. A/AC.125/L.80).
198. Nayar, supra note 3, at 337.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 338.
201. Okafor LL.M. Thesis, supra note 186, at 248-49.
202. Nayar, supra note 3, at 337.
203. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340-43.
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peoples may attack a state that does not conduct itself in
accordance with this principle.20 4 When such peoples receive
military support from a third-party state, the oppressed state
cannot be deemed to have contravened paragraph 1 of the
Declaration dealing with the use of force against state territorial
integrity, or Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. 20 5 Moreover, the
Declaration stipulates, "[n]othing in the foregoing paragraphs shall
be construed as enlarging or diminishing in any way the scope of
the provisions of the [U.N.] Charter concerning cases in which the
use of force is lawful. ' 20 6 Arguably, supplying troops to assist
peoples fighting for self-determination claims is lawful because
such action furthers the purposes of the United Nations.
Consequently, it is difficult to accept Professor Cassese's view
that third-party states cannot send military troops in aid of peoples
embroiled in a self-determination war. Such assistance conforms
with the letter and spirit of the U.N. Charter and other relevant
international instruments pertaining to self-determination. 20 7
Although third-party states are permitted to assist those fighting
self-determination wars, they are prohibited from assisting in
repression of peoples fighting for self-determination. 20 8  As
Antonio Cassese rightly observes, "In the case of wars for self-
determination, third states must refrain from helping the State but
are authorised to provide assistance.., to national liberation
movements." 209
While providing for the right of self-determination, the U.N.
Charter also stipulates that the United Nations, in support of this
right, shall not intervene in matters that are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state.210 Additionally, the United
Nations may not require the state to submit such matters for
settlement.21 1 Arguably, these provisions do not limit the right of
self-determination. First, according to the practice of United
204. Okafor LL.M. Thesis, supra note 186, at 248.
205. See id at 248-49.
206. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340-43.
207. U.N. CHARTER, art. 56; see also Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86,
at 340-43.
208. CASSESE, supra note 79, at 152.
209. Id. at 153.
210. See HAROLD S. JOHNSON, SELF-DETERMINATION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY OF
NATIONS 49 (1967) [hereinafter JOHNSON, COMMUNITY OF NATIONS].
211. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 7.
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Nations members, a matter is not considered to be within the
"domestic jurisdiction" of a state if it: (1) amounts to breach of
international law; (2) constitutes an infringement of the interests
of another state; (3) amounts to a gross violation of human rights;
(4) constitutes a threat to international peace; or (5) pertains to
development of self-government in a colony.212 Second, the right
of self-determination, recognized in various international law fora,
has acquired the status of customary international law. As
observed by the International Court of Justice in East Timor (Port.
v. Austl.):
[I]n the Court's view, Portugal's assertion that the right of
peoples to self-determination, as it evolved from the Charter
and from the United Nations practice, has an erga omnes
character, is irreproachable. The principle of self-
determination of peoples has been recognized by the United
Nations Charter and in the jurisprudence of the Court... it is
one of the essential principles of contemporary international
law.213
The erga omnes character of the right of self-determination
mandates that states within the international community have a
legal obligation to fulfill this right. 214 Consequently, the right of
self-determination embodied in customary international law
cannot be affected by Article 2(7), which limits only rights derived
from the U.N. Charter. 215
The third reason the domestic jurisdiction principles in the
U.N. Charter do not limit self-determination is that self-
determination is included in Article 1 of the U.N. Charter as one
of the purposes of the United Nations, while the domestic
jurisdiction safeguard is contained in Article 2 as one of the
governing principles of the organization.216 Further, during the
technical committee's discussion of the drafting of the U.N.
212. MICHAEL BARTON AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 207 (6th ed., Routledge 1992) (1970).
213. Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austi.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, at 102, 29 (Judgment of
June 30).
214. See KINDRED, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 85, at 59.
215. George Steven Swan, Self-Determination and the United Nations Charter, 22
INDIAN J. INT'L L. 264, 268 (1982) (citing Johnson, Self-Determination, supra note 160, at
160).
216. Nayar, supra note 3, at 341.
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Charter, the committee drew a distinction between the "purposes"
and the "principles" of the U.N. Charter:
The "Purposes" constitute the raison d'etre of the Organization.
They are the aggregation of the common ends on which our
minds met; hence, the cause and object of the [U.N.] Charter to
which member states collectively and severally subscribe. The
chapter on "Principles" sets, in the same order of ideas, the
methods and regulating norms according to which the
Organization and its members shall do their duty and
endeavour to achieve the common ends. Their understandings
should serve as actual standards of international conduct.217
Consequently, where there is conflict between the right to
self-determination and the domestic jurisdiction principle, self-
determination should prevail because a means cannot be
interpreted to frustrate an end.218
Reading Article 1(1) in conjunction with paragraph 7 of the
Declaration, however, suggests that peoples living in metropolitan
states cannot invoke the right of self-determination to secede.
Instead, before exercising their right to secede, such peoples must
demonstrate serious human rights violations or the risk of physical
extermination. 219 Thus, peoples in a metropolitan state may only
invoke the right of self-determination to secede if their
government does not represent their interests and discriminates
against them.220
There is no doubt that the right of self-determination
guaranteed by the Declaration has universal application.
Secession constitutes one of the modes of exercising the right.221
The African states employed the principle of self-determination
enunciated in these legal organs in the decolonization of European
217. Id. at 341-42 (quoting U.N. Doc. 944, 11/34(1); 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 446-47
(1945)).
218. Id. at 342.
219. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340-43; see also Reference
re: Secession of Quebec, supra note 108, at 441.
220. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340-43; see also Reference
re: Secession of Quebec, supra note 108, at 441.
221. See Nayar, supra note 3, at 337. Cassese, one of the avowed opponents of
secession, admitted that the Declaration authorized secession: "Although secession is
implicitly authorised [sic] by the Declaration, it must however be construed, as with all
exceptions." CASSESE, supra note 79, at 153.
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territories.222 African leaders recognized the need for a "regional
human rights instrument" to establish this principle.223
E. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
In 1981, the Assembly of Heads of States and Government of
the Organization of African Unity adopted the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter).224 Articles 19 and
20 of the African Charter guarantee the right of self-determination
to all peoples.225 Article 19 provides, "All peoples shall be equal;
they shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the same rights.
Nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another."
226
Article 20 provides:
(1) All peoples shall have the right to existence. They
shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to
self-determination. They shall freely determine their
political status and shall pursue their economic and social
development according to the policy they have freely
chosen.
(2) Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to
free themselves from the bonds of domination by
resorting to any means recognized by the international
community.
(3) All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the
States parties to the present Charter in their liberation
struggle against foreign domination, be it political,
economic or cultural.
227
It is clear from the text of the African Charter that the right of
self-determination benefits a larger group than just colonized and
oppressed peoples. Stated more succinctly, the provisions that
pertain to self-determination "do not have any words or phrases to
suggest a restricted meaning of the 'all peoples' phrase and that
being the case ... the ordinary meaning already indicated should
222. See, e.g., African Charter, supra note 86.
223. See, e.g., id.
224. Id.; see also Addo, supra note 109, at 182.
225. African Charter, supra note 86.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 59.
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prevail, i.e., a broader interpretation to cover not only colonial
peoples but also peoples living in independent African
countries.
228
Peoples living under any repressive government can invoke
the right of self-determination guaranteed in Articles 19 and 20.
notwithstanding the international status of the state.
Moreover, Article 20(1) recognizes self-determination as an
inalienable right, which cannot be eradicated. 229  It further
acknowledges the right of peoples to "corporate existence."
230
Any attempt at physical extermination of a group constitutes a
breach of this provision. 231  In exercising this right of self-
determination under the African Charter, peoples in such a
situation may secede, especially if it is the only practical method to
secure their existence. 232  "At the normative level, the 1982
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights clearly provides
for the right of oppressed minorities and other peoples to various
kinds of self-determination, up to and including secession from an
established state."
233
Under the African Charter, a state that denies a peoples'
access to participate in government breaches the principle of
equality adumbrated in Article 19.234 Under such circumstances,
the right to self-determination can be exercised through secession.
The state cannot legitimately invoke the principle of sovereignty
and territorial integrity to prevent such secession because the state
would lose its power to govern such people. A state that does not
promote participation in government "but instead represses the
people, destroys their culture and economically exploits
them.., loses legitimacy as a government and can not prevail on
its claim of territorial integrity." 235  Thus, it is fundamentally
important for states to encourage access to a democratic process.
228. Addo, supra note 109, at 186.
229. Parsons Letter, supra note 93, at 396.
230. Addo, supra note 109, at 190.
231. Id.
232. See OSITA C. EZE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: SOME SELECTED PROBLEMS 96,
120 (1984); see also UMOZURIKE, supra note 1, at 269.
233. OBIORA CHINEDU OKAFOR, RE-DEFINING LEGITIMATE STATEHOOD:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STATE FRAGMENTATION AFRICA 138 (2000).
234. See Addo, supra note 109, at 190.
235. Eva Herzer, The Right to Self-Determination: The Legal Cornerstone to Tibet's
Future (May 13,2000), at http://www.heartibet.org/herzer.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2003).
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F. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
In 1993, the World Conference on Human Rights adopted the
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (Vienna
Declaration). 236  Reaffirming Article 1 of the International
Covenants,237 the Vienna Declaration stipulates that the denial of
the right of self-determination constitutes a violation of human
rights. 238 Furthermore, in its preamble, the Vienna Declaration
reaffirms the commitment of U.N. members in Article 56 of the
Charter.239  In sum, the Vienna Declaration asserts self-
determination as a group human right.240
G. The Declaration on Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the
United Nations
In 1995, the United Nations adopted the Declaration on
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations
(Anniversary Declaration). 241 The Anniversary Declaration, in
recognizing the right to self-determination, stipulates that the
member states will:
Continue to reaffirm the right of self-determination of all
peoples, taking into account the particular situation of peoples
under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign
occupation, and recognize the right of peoples to take
legitimate action in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations to realize their inalienable right of self-
determination.242
The Anniversary Declaration recognizes self-determination
as an inalienable right that cannot be derogated.243 Ordinarily,
236. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. AICONF.157/24
(1993), reprinted in WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE VIENNA
DECLARATION AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION 25 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna
Declaration].
237. Id.; Reference re: Secession of Quebec, supra note 108, at 436.
238. Vienna Declaration, supra note 236.
239. Id at pmbl.
240. See id.
241. Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 50/6, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. AIRes50/6 (1995) [hereinafter
Anniversary Declaration].
242. Id. at 2-3.
243. See id.
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U.N. General Assembly resolutions have no binding effect. 244
Arguably, Resolutions 1514 and 1541, the Vienna Declaration, and
the Anniversary Declaration, may be characterized as General
Assembly resolutions that are binding. These resolutions have
been "voted for by overwhelming majorities of members of the
General Assembly frequently over a period of time giving rise to a
general opinio juris, and as such, constitute a norm of customary
international law." 245  In South West Africa, the International
Court of Justice held that a single resolution might be
recommendatory while the repetition may transform it into a
customary rule of law.246
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the wealth of
international law instruments that guarantee the right of peoples
to self-determination. The right, as guaranteed in most of these
instruments, has universal application, as it applies to both colonial
and noncolonial situations. 247 The most controversial aspect of
self-determination, however, is identifying the possessor of the
right.248 This problem is crucial in determining the scope and
content of the right.
V. SCOPE AND CONTENT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
A. Claiming the Right of Self-Determination
Until now, there has been no generally accepted meaning of
"peoples," "nations," "self," "unit," "nationality," "distinct
community" or similar terminology used to describe our diverse
political and social existence. 249 Even former U.S. President
Woodrow Wilson could not define "self," in the context of the
right of self-determination, despite his popularization of the
concept.250
244. See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 10-11, 13-14.
245. See South West Africa Cases, (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.) 1960 I.C.J. 6, 323,
59.
246. See id. at 323.
247. See, e.g., Addo, supra note 109, at 187; M. G. Kaladharan, Self-Determination
Beyond the Colonial Context Biafra in Retrospect, 10 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321,334,336 (1975).
248. JOHNSON, COMMUNITY OF NATIONS, supra note 210, at 49.
249. See, e.g., Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459,462 (1971).
250. See, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 79, at 22 n.31 (quoting R. LANSING, THE PEACE
NEGOTIATIONS: A PERSONAL NARRATIVE 97 (1921)).
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President Wilson's own cabinet fiercely criticized him,
including his Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, who questioned
whether Wilson clearly understood the idea of self-
determination. 251 Regarding President Wilson's understanding of
the term, Lansing wondered "[W]hat unit has he in mind? Does
he mean a race, a territorial area, or a community? Without a
definite unit which is practical, application of this principle is
dangerous to peace and stability."252
Without a commonly accepted definition, the meaning
attached to "peoples" for the purposes of exercising the right of
self-determination has become largely "context-dependent. '253
The right of self-determination provided for in the various
international instruments is meant to enable the people to
determine their political status and to pursue freely their
economic, social, and cultural development. 254 The right of self-
determination, however, recognized in Resolutions 1514 and 1541
and chapters XI and XII of the U.N. Charter, is only applicable to
peoples in colonial situations.255  In Western Sahara, the
International Court of Justice stated that the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and
Resolution 1514 characterize the principle of self-determination as
a right of emancipation from a colonial situation.256 Further, the
court states that Resolution 1514 provided the basis for
decolonization, while Resolution 1541 complemented it by
stipulating the possible outcome to be either "emergence as a
sovereign independent State, free association with an independent
State, or integration with an independent State."257
The U.N. Charter, Declaration, International Covenants,
Vienna Declaration, African Charter, and other legal instruments
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Okafor LL.M. Thesis, supra note 186, at 137.
254. Resolution 1514, supra note 110, at 66, 2; see also Declaration on Friendly
Relations, supra note 86, at 340-43; International Civil Covenant, supra note 132, art. 1, 1,
999 U.N.T.S. at 173; International Economic Covenant, supra note 131, art. 1, 1 1, 993
U.N.T.S. at 5; Vienna Declaration, supra note 236, art. 1, 2; Anniversary Declaration,
supra note 241, at 5; African Charter, supra note 86, arts. 19-20.
255. See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 73-85; Resolution 1514, supra note 110, at 66;
Resolution 1541, supra note 111, at 29.
256. Western Sahara Case, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 24, 55.
257. Id. 957.
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apply the right of self-determination beyond the colonial
context.258 The Supreme Court of Canada supported this view:
The recognized sources of international law establish that the
right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled
through internal self-determination-a people's pursuit of its
political, economic, social and cultural development within the
framework of an existing state. A right to external self-
determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of
the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the
most extreme cases and, even then, under carefully defined
circumstances. 2
59
The preparatory work involved in formulating these
resolutions bolsters the assertion that they apply beyond the
colonial context.260 For instance, in its report to the U.N. General
Assembly, the special committee charged with drafting the
Declaration asserted that the "first paragraph should contain a
general statement of the principle [of self-determination], stressing
its universality." 261 During the Drafting Committee debate, the
United States took the position that the right to self-determination
"was recognized as belonging to 'all peoples,' not only to
dependent peoples." 26
2
In June 1945, however, the Secretariat of the Coordination
Committee responsible for drafting the Charter submitted a
memorandum that explains the use of the word 'peoples':
No difficulty appears to arise from the use of the word
"peoples" which is included in the Technical Committee texts
whenever the idea of "all mankind" or "all human beings" is to
be emphasized ... [T]he word "peoples" is used in connection
with the phrase "self-determination of peoples." This phrase is
in such common usage that no other word seems appropriate.
258. Addo, supra note 109, at 186; Nayar, supra note 3, at 324; see also id. at 336 (citing
Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, 1); Anniversary Declaration, supra note
241, at 1-2; Vienna Declaration, supra note 236, art. 1, 2; OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note
81, at 154.
259. Reference re: Secession of Quebec, supra note 108, at 437-38.
260. See, e.g., Resolution 2181, supra note 194, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 19,
at 63, U.N. Doc. A/7619 (1969).
261. Resolution 2181, supra note 194, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 19, at 63,
U.N. Doc. A17619 (1969).
262. CASSESE, supra note 79, at 110-11, n.15 (quoting J 25, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1180
and noting Portugal and Spain as other countries that supported the U.S. position at 27,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1182).
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The question was raised in the Coordination Committee as to
whether the juxtaposition of "friendly relations among nations"
and "self-determination of peoples" is proper. There appears
to be no difficulty in this juxtaposition since "nations" is used in
the sense of all political entities, states and non-states, whereas
"peoples" refers to groups of human beings who may, or may
not, comprise states or nations.
263
Therefore, the term "self," as used in the U.N. Charter, refers
to groups of human beings that may or may not be comprised of
states or nations. In other words, all groups of human beings are
entitled to exercise the right of self-determination. Similarly, the
preparatory documents of the International Covenants bear
eloquent testimony to the fact that the right of self-determination
applies beyond colonial situations.264 For instance, during debate
at the drafting stage, Afghanistan posited that self-determination
"would have to be proclaimed even in a world from which colonial
territories had vanished. '265 Similarly, the western states insisted,
"if the right to self-determination were incorporated in the
Covenants, it should also apply to the peoples of sovereign States
oppressed by their own governments." 266
The objections by some notable states to India's reservations
of Article 1 of the International Covenants further the universal
acceptance of the right of self-determination. 267 The Netherlands
reaction is instructive on the matter. "The right of self-
determination as embodied in the [International] Covenants is
conferred upon all peoples .... [A]ny attempt to limit the scope of
this right or attach conditions not provided for in the relevant
instruments would undermine the concept of self-determination
itself .... "268
263. UNITED NATIONS, DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, U.N. Doc. WD/381, CO/156, 18 U.N.C.I.O. Docs.
657-58 (1945).
264. See, e.g., Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 10th
Sess., 644th mtg., Agenda Item 28, art. 10, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.644 (1955).
265. Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., 644th
mtg., Agenda Item 28, art. 10, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.644.
266. CASSESE, supra note 79, at 51.
267. See, e.g., U.N. CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS-STATUS OF
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, INT'L COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS at 19, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/5, U.N. Sales No. E.87.XIV.2 (1987).
268. Id.
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The preparatory documents are silent as to the scope of the
African Charter. The text of the African Charter, however,
explicitly provides that the right beyond the colonial context 269 is
the right of self-determination to all colonial or oppressed
peoples.270 "Colonial" and "oppressed" are not co-extensive in
Article 20(2).271 "Oppressed people" covers a wider spectrum
than colonial and "must mean non-colonised peoples who are
oppressed. '272 Oppressed peoples can use any means at their
disposal to achieve freedom. As stated in the Anniversary
Declaration, the right of self-determination recognized by the
African Charter is an inalienable right that cannot be derogated. 273
Similarly, the referenced charters and declarations recognized self-
determination as a group human right.274 According to the
Supreme Court of Canada, "[t]he right to self-determination has
developed largely as a human right. ' 275 Therefore, "violations of
self-determination are violations of human rights." 276
The word "peoples" in the African Charter was deliberately
left undefined to avoid confusion. 277 Nevertheless, "peoples"
within the context of the African Charter refers to "groups within
independent African states."278 This literal reading conforms to
international principles of treaty interpretation.279
"Self" has been defined as a "[c]ollection of individuals
having a legitimate interest which is primarily political, but may
also be economic, cultural, or of any other kind. ' 280 "Self" can
also represent an identifiable group of people having common
legitimate aims.281 The group includes the whole population of a
269. See African Charter, supra note 86, art. 20, 2.
270. Id.
271. See Okafor LL.M. Thesis, supra note 186, at 138.
272. OKAFOR, RE-DEFINING LEGITIMATE STATEHOOD, supra note 233, at 121, n.96
(2000); see also African Charter, supra note 86, art. 20, 1 2.
273. See African Charter, supra note 86, art. 20, 1.
274. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2; see also id. art. 55; Resolution 1541, supra note
111 art. 1, 2; see also Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340-43; African
Charter, supra note 86, art. 20, 1; Vienna Declaration, supra note 237, art. 1, 12.
275. Reference re: Secession of Quebec, supra note 108, at 437.
276. Thornberry, supra note 77, at 883.
277. Addo, supra note 109, at 184.
278. I& at 185.
279. See id.
280. See UMOZURIKE, supra note 1, at 195.
281. Id. at 272.
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state, but can also represent part of the population of a state.282
Under certain circumstances, it may represent the population of
multiple states.
283
One view holds that only a "[s]elf-conscious politically
coherent community that is under the political subjugation of
another community," is entitled to exercise the right of self-
determination. 284 The purpose of self-determination is to "remove
a community from the political domination of another group and
permit it to gain control of its own destiny" and "to remedy or
eradicate a deprivation." 285 Self-determination applies to peoples
that have been "deprived of the ability to govern themselves by
some other political entity."286  This interpretation of "self"
suggests that the claimant group can only exercise the right of self-
determination by secession or by gaining autonomy from the
dominant group. This interpretation may be too restrictive, for
groups may decide to integrate with parent or other states, as did
Hawaii and Alaska upon their integration with the United States.
In Greco-Bulgarian, the Permanent Court of International
Justice outlined some of the common characteristics and interests
a people seeking self-determination may share. The Court defined
"self" as:
[A] group of persons living in a given country or locality, having
a race, religion, language and traditions of their own and united
by this identity of race, religion, language and traditions in a
sentiment of solidarity, with a view to preserving their
traditions, maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the
instruction and upbringing of their children in accordance with
the spirit and traditions of their race and rendering mutual
assistance to each other.287
A people, however, need not be homogenous, for there is no
requirement that only a single people comprise a state.288 The
preparatory documents showed that during the debate at the
282. Id. at 195; see also Reference re: Secession of Quebec, supra note 108, at 437.
283. UMOZURIKE, supra note 1, at 195.
284. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 81, at 156.
285. Id. at 155-56.
286. Id. (quoting Michael S. Carter, Ethnic Minority Groups and Self-Determination:
The Case of Basque, 20 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 55, 61 (1986)).
287. Advisory Opinion No. 17, Interpretation of the Convention Between Greece and
Bulgaria Respecting Reciprocal Emigration, 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. F) No. 17, at 4, 21.
288. Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, supra note 137, at 36.
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drafting of the International Covenants, delegates regarded
peoples either as colonial peoples289 or as peoples oppressed by
their tyrannical government. 290 Under Chapter XI of the U.N.
Charter, territorial-based peoples may exercise the right of self-
determination. 291  Resolution 1514 and the Declaration's
recognition of the right of self-determination, through integration
or association of peoples based on equality with another state,
further bolster this fact.292  The people do not need to be
concentrated in a particular territory, but may claim a particular
territory. The memorandum of the Coordination Committee of
the U.N. Charter does not suggest that the people who are entitled
to exercise the right of self-determination must be homogenous. 293
"Peoples" can also be seen as "a social entity that have
common ancestry, history, religion, language, culture.., and
possess an awareness or state of mind that they are not just a
population but have a sense of identity."294  The term "self"
encompasses the idea that a group should possess common
characteristics and be conscious of their identity. 295 The claimant
need not be oppressed or threatened with physical extermination,
and should be distinguished by its evasion of assimilation by the
dominant group.2
96
The most far-reaching and pervading meaning of "peoples"
includes "[a]ll oppressed peoples whether under colonial or
internal oppressive domination are entitled to assert the right to
self-determination and come therefore within the definition of
peoples or nations for the purposes of the legal concept of self-
determination."297 Further:
[T]he central idea that animates any claim for self-
determination by whatever name called or by whosoever made
is that of 'alienation.' The claimant invariably perceives present
rule as colonial, alien or oppressive, and is therefore, alienated.
289. See Mexico Proposal to Human Rights Commission, at 241 U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.310 (1950).
290. See id.
291. U.N. CHARTER, art. 55.
292. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340-43.
293. See, e.g., Hannum, Rethinking Self-Deternination, supra note 137, at 36.
294. Nanda, supra note 193, at 446.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Okafor LL.M. Thesis, supra note 186, at 138.
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The crucial question therefore is to ask whether there is
widespread alienation amongst an identifiable group exhibiting
socio-political and/or economic solidarity and attributable to
the behavior of another group towards it? If this sort of
alienation exists then that former group itself becomes a 'self
entitled to "determine" subject to other evaluative and practical
criteria for implementation.
298
For an entity to qualify as "peoples," it must possess both
objective and subjective characteristics. Some of the objective
elements the group may possess are: (1) common history; (2)
common territory or geographical location; (3) cultural, linguistic,
racial or ethnic ties; or (4) religious or ideological ties.299
Collectively, these elements only satisfy the objective element of
"self" and cannot qualify a group as "peoples," unless the group
members are subjectively conscious of their distinctiveness.
This subjective element of "self" encourages peoples to fight
for their common destiny. A group must have common grievances
or interests that they wish to protect or preserve. Consequently,
any group can qualify as "peoples" and attain the right of self-
determination if the groups experiences: (1) external or internal
domination;300 (2) oppression;30 1 (3) serious or grave human rights
violations;30 2 (4) foreign or alien subjugation;30 3 (5) great
repression;3° 4 (6) threat of physical extermination; 30 5 or (7) denial
of representation and participation in the government of the
state.3
06
In order to satisfy the requirements of the various
international instruments, the method by which self-determination
is expressed must conform to the freely expressed will of the
people.30 7 For instance, exercising the right of self-determination
led to Puerto Rico's association with the United States and the
298. See id at 138.
299. Nanda, supra note 193, at 446.
300. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340.
301. Reference re: Secession of Quebec, supra note 108, at 442.
302. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340.
303. See id.
304. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340.
305. UMOZURIKE, supra note 1, at 269.
306. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340-43; see also Vienna
Declaration, supra note 237, art. 1, 2; Reference re: Secession of Quebec, supra note 108,
at 440-41.
307. UMOZURIKE,supra note 1, at 193.
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Cook Islands' association with New Zealand.30 8  Similarly,
Greenland merged with Denmark through the exercise of self-
determination. 30 9 This occurred after the will of the people was
ascertained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 of the
Declaration and Principle VI of Resolution 1541.310 Arguably, any
attempt to merge colonies with a metropolitan state without
ascertaining the wishes of the peoples is contrary to international
law, the U.N. Charter, 311 and Article 56, paragraph 4 of the
Declaration, which states:
[AIll Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate
action in corporation with the Organisation for the achievement
of the purposes set forth in Article 55. The pledge to respect
the principle of self-determination is in relation to all peoples
under a state's jurisdiction, whether in mandated, trusteeship,
colonial, or metropolitan territories.31
2
Creech Jones, a British representative speaking before the
Economic and Social Council in 1956, observed that "[t]here were
subject peoples within sovereign States, for whom the United
Nations must care as it had for peoples under the control of
imperial Powers." 313  In the United Nations "Belgium has
consistently argued that the application of the principle to only
colonial territories is unfair." 314  The principle of self-
determination should apply to peoples within metropolitan states,
"whose relations with the states concerned was essentially the
same as that between European countries and their overseas
territories. "315
Therefore, self-determination is not just achieved by securing
independence and emancipating peoples from alien colonial rule,
but also by liberating peoples from tyranny and oppression.316
Consequently, "there is no reason why any oppressed people
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 85.
312. Id. at 188-89 (quoting Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340-
43).
313. Id. at 184 (quoting British representative Creech Jones, Address Before the U.N.
Economic and Social Council (1956)).
314. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 81, at 134.
315. Id.
316. Reference re: Secession of Quebec, supra note 108, at 385, 138.
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should not enjoy this right to shake away the oppressor, be him
from across the seas or from the same racial stock!" 317  All
"oppressed peoples, whether under colonial or internal oppressive
domination, are entitled to assert the right of self-
determination. '" 3
18
B. Exercising the Right of Self-Determination Through Secession
Self-determination should be exercised through secession to
assure a peoples' existence in realization of their human rights.319
Secession is not the only mode of exercising the right of self-
determination, but under certain circumstances, it may become the
desired result. Peoples may choose to secede if there is a threat to
their physical existence, such as genocide, or a grave violation of
human rights.320 Furthermore, states pledge to take action to
achieve the purposes of the United Nations regarding self-
determination, 321 and under the Declaration, states are enjoined
from committing human rights violations.322
Moreover, a government that oppresses its peoples, violates
their fundamental human rights, and commits genocide, cannot
represent the whole population without discrimination. According
to one commentator:
Wilson sought peace above all else. In his thinking, justice
played a critical role in the preservation of peace: he believed
that the subjugation of one distinct community by another was
unjust, and thus, would inevitably lead to a threat to peace.
Implicit in Wilson's approach lies a belief in the desirability of
secession since it would create new states coterminous with
national communities, despite their many problems.
323
317. Okafor LL.M. Thesis, supra note 187, at 123.
318. Id. at 138.
319. See UMOZURIKE, supra note 1, at 92; see also M.G. Kaladharan, supra note 247, at
343 (stating: "Complete independence for a people would be unavoidable in situations
involving denial of basic human rights and exploitation.").
320. Reference re: Secession of Quebec, supra note 108, at 440-41.
321. McCorquodale, supra note 147, at 19.
322. Hannum, New Developments, supra note 84, quoted in Williams, Indigenous
Peoples' Survival, supra note 84, at 663 n.3.
323. BARTKUS, supra note 19, at 17.
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C. The Principle of Territorial Integrity as a Defense to Secession
If a government does not guarantee the safety and security of
the lives and properties of its population, then that government
has failed in its duties and forfeited the obedience of such
peoples.324  The government cannot invoke the principle of
territorial integrity to prevent the peoples from opting out of the
state.325 It would be tantamount to a denial of the peoples' right
to self-determination if those under an authoritarian government
could not secede. Such peoples cannot reasonably expect to
determine their political status, or pursue their economic, social,
and cultural development under such circumstances.
326
It appears that the principle of self-determination developed
"within a framework of respect for the territorial integrity of
existing states."327 Almost all the international instruments that
recognize the existence of a peoples' right to self-determination
contain the caveat that exercise of the right should not constitute a
threat to the territorial integrity of an existing state, provided the
state in question is conducting itself in a manner that does not
undermine the general principle of self-determination.
328
The Declaration on Friendly Relations,329  Vienna
Declaration, 330 and Anniversary Declaration 331 all contain this
caveat. In each of these sources, "immediately after affirming
peoples' right to determine political, economic, and cultural
issues," 332 is the following statement:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States, conducting
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus
possessed of a government representing the whole people
324. Id. at 22.
325. See id. at 22.
326. CASSESE, supra note 79, at 286.
327. Reference re: Secession of Quebec, supra note 108, at 438.
328. Id.
329. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340-43.
330. Vienna Declaration, supra note 236, art. 1, 12.
331. Anniversary Declaration, supra note 241, at 3.
332. Reference re: Secession of Quebec, supra note 108, at 438.
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belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed
or colour.
33 3
This requirement is not intended to preclude peoples from
exercising their right to self-determination, but rather it is an
attempt to reconcile the right of self-determination with the
principle of territorial integrity. The principle of territorial
integrity is contingent upon the state representing the whole
population without discrimination. Consequently, if a people lack
access to government, suffer attack on their physical. existence,
experience violations of their human rights, or endure oppression,
they cannot be prevented from exercising their right of self-
determination by a state's reliance on the principle of territorial
integrity. 33
4
The provision of the right of territorial integrity in Resolution
1514 is stated in terms that are more absolute. Paragraph 6
stipulates that "any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption
of national unity and territorial integrity of country is incompatible
with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations." 335 The preparatory documents, however, demonstrate
that paragraph 6 was intended to preclude the administering
powers from disintegrating colonial territories before granting
independence to the people.336 It was not intended to limit the
peoples' exercise of the right of self-determination.
337
Neither the International Covenants nor the African Charter
provide for protection of the principle of territorial integrity.
Since the preamble in each of these documents reaffirms the
principles stated in the U.N. Charter, however they arguably
acknowledge the existence of the state's right to territorial
integrity. Consequently, the principle of territorial integrity and
the right to self-determination are compatible, to the extent that
the government represents all peoples within the state.
338
-333. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 340-43.
334. Reference re: Secession of Quebec, supra note 108, at 440-41.
335. Resolution 1514, supra note 110, at 66.
336. See, e.g., Blay, supra note 118, at 442.
337. Id.
338. Reference re: Secession of Quebec, supra note 108, at 439.
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D. Biafra's Eligibility to Claim the Right of Self-Determination
Biafrans were an ethnically heterogeneous group.339 There
was not much difference, however, between the Ibo majority
group and the non-Ibo minority.340 The Willinck Commission,
appointed by the British Government in 1958, studied the issue of
minority tribes in Nigeria and noted, "the difference between the
Ibo and non-Ibo minorities was sufficiently slight to be soon
expunged by the growing nationalism." 341 The 1963 census shows
that of an approximate population of fourteen million, Ibos
comprised 64%; Efik and Ibibio 17%; Annang 5.5%; Ijaw and
Ogoni 7.5%; Ekoi, Yalla, and Ukelle 3.4%; and other groups
2.6% .342
Long before the British exercised direct authority over the
Northern and Southern protectorate in 1914, a clear boundary
existed between the Eastern and Northern regions.343 The peoples
that inhabit the Eastern region have arguably occupied the
territory since its inception. 344 They are easily identified by their
various "traditional political structures," distinct culture, language
and history. 345  Even before the government gained its
independence in 1960, the Eastern region established its own
internal self-government and maintained its own representation in
London.
346
Biafrans satisfied the criteria as "peoples" entitled to exercise
the right of self-determination. Biafrans had a common history, a
common territory or geographical location, and cultural, racial, or
ethnic ties. Furthermore, Biafrans had a group consciousness that
was distinct and manifested a sense of common destiny. They had
a common commitment to protect themselves against
extermination, prevent gross violation of their rights, and resist
oppression and other forms of human rights abuses. The peoples
339. See, e.g., Nayar, supra note 3, at 326.
340. See, e.g., id.
341. Id.
342. Nixon, supra note 48, at 480; see also Nayar, supra note 3, at 325-26; Dr. T. 0.
Elias, Nigeria: The Development of its Laws and Constitution 1, 4 (1967), in 14 THE
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONS
(George W. Keeton, ed., 1967).
343. Nixon, supra note 48, at 480.
344. Elias, supra note 342, at 4.
345. Ezetah, supra note 166, at 814.
346. Nixon, supra note 48, at 481--82.
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of the Eastern region of Biafra, therefore, qualify as the "self" for
the purposes of self-determination.
[B]ut in case of the Eastern region this was not the case. Its
lines, its boundaries, its areas of jurisdiction had long historic
roots, which had in fact been the operative lines and operative
jurisdiction throughout a period of conflict with the rest of the
country. If any entity in Nigeria was recognised by others as
appropriate entity to exercise self-determination, it was the
region as then constituted.34
7
In sum, "the strongest piece of evidence supporting the
Biafran's claim as a distinct group with an overwhelming desire for
independence was their willingness to suffer almost three years of
civil war, disease, and famine to achieve that independence. '348
The vexing question is whether Biafra's secession was a legitimate
exercise of its right of self-determination under international law.
E. The Right of Biafra to Secede Under International Law
Denied human rights in other parts of the country, including
the right to live, the Biafrans were entitled to secure their very
existence if they could do so by secession. 349 Prior to their
declaration of independence, Biafrans suffered great oppression
and other forms of gross human rights abuses at the hands of the
central government and peoples from other sections of the
country. 350  The proclamation of Biafra described that
"defenseless men, women, and children were shot down or hacked
to death [and] some were burnt alive. Women and young girls
were ravished with unprecedented bestiality; unborn children were
torn out of the wombs of their mothers and killed."'351
Over fifty thousand Biafrans lost their lives and over two
million others became refugees as a consequence of these abuses.
The federal government left the culprits unpunished, and the
whole matter uninvestigated. Further, the federal government
compounded Biafra's plight by imposing a blockade 352 restricting
347. Id.
348. L. C. BUCHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 174
(1978).
349. UMOZURIKE, supra note 1, at 266.
350. Nixon, supra note 48, at 476.
351. Ikoku, supra note 24, at 667-68.
352. UMOZURIKE, supra note 1, at 264-65.
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all communication and other transactions with the Eastern
region.353 The government also refused to give the Eastern region
its share of statutory revenue months before Biafra declared its
independence.
354
Consequently, when Biafra declared its independence, no
Biafran had security of life or property in the country. 355 The duty
of the federal government to secure lives and property, however,
extended all over the country.356 The government demonstrated
that it lacked either the will or the power to enact and apply just
and effective guarantees over the safety of Biafrans.
357
Further, the government acted aggressively towards Biafrans
by severing communications and stopping payment of statutory
allocations. 358  As a result, the secession of Biafra is legally
justified on the ground that the Biafrans experienced rejection by
their own country and faced extermination. Under such
conditions, the Biafrans could not have been "enjoying self-
determination" as guaranteed in several international
instruments. 359  The justification for the "extreme step" of
secession "rests both on the denial of human rights and the dim
prospects for [the Biafrans'] future development.
'360
Human atrocities such as these clearly implicate the Biafrans'
right to exercise self-determination through secession.
Furthermore, the majority of Biafrans supported the decision to
secede.361  Lastly, the government flagrantly failed to create
conditions necessary to assure Biafrans an equitable position and
safety within the federal government.
362
As observed by the Supreme Court of Canada in, "the right of
self-determination has developed largely as [a] human right.
363
The Nigerian government had an obligation to promote and
353. ALEXIS HERACLIDES, THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF MINORITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 85 (1991).
354. Ikoku, supra note 24, at 670.
355. See, e.g., UMOZURIKE, supra note 1, at 264.
356. Id
357. See id.
358. Id
359. Id. at 269.
360. Id
361. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 49, at 173.
362. See Nnoli, supra note 2, at 123.
363. Reference re: Secession of Quebec, supra note 108, at 437.
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respect this right.364  *Therefore, the gross violations of the
Biafrans' human rights provide a legal justification for Biafra's
secession. The Nigerian government forfeited any legitimacy it
had to oppose the secession by invoking the right of territorial
integrity and sovereignty. 365 As noted by the Foreign Ministry of
the defunct Republic of Biafra:
[W]hen the state ceases to stand for the honour, the protection
and well-being of all its citizens, then it is no longer the
instrument of those it rejected. In such a case, the people have
a right to create another instrument for their protection, in
other words, to create another state.
366
The Nigerian government's failure to punish violators of
Biafrans' rights encouraged the killing of army officers of the
Eastern region on July 29, 1966,367 and the massacres of
Easterners in other parts of Nigeria in May, July, September, and
October of 1966.368 Similarly, the secession of Bangladesh from
Pakistan was justified partly because of the Pakistani army's
outrageous violations of the East Bengal peoples' human rights.
Conversely, the lack of support for the unsuccessful secession
attempt of Katanga from Congo might be explained in part by the
lack of gross human right abuses committed by the Congolese
government.
Biafra's declaration of independence is justified because it
was the most plausible way of restoring peace in Nigeria "when
dialogue and harmonious co-existence" were no longer possible.
369
Despite the violence, repression, and other acts of aggression
directed against them, Biafra persisted in seeking a peaceful
solution to the crisis. In contrast, the federal government was
364. See Resolution 1514, supra note 110, at 67; Declaration on Friendly Relations,
supra note 86, at 340.
365. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 86, at 67.
366. The Republic of Biafra Foreign Ministry, Biafra-Why the O.A.U. Has Failed, 2
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 398,406 (1969) (quoting a Tanzanian Government official).
367. See HERACLIDES, supra note 353, at 85; BARTKUS, supra note 19, at 122; Nixon,
supra note 48, at 475.
368. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 49, at 166.
369. Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Statement to German Parliament (Sept. 4, 1991),
quoted in Payam Akhavan, Self-Determination and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia: What
Lessons for the International Community?, in SELF-DETERMINATION: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 240 (Donald Clark & Robert Williams eds., Macmillian Press Ltd. 1996)
[hereinafter Chancellor Kohl Statement].
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stubborn and refused to implement agreements that sought
peaceful resolution of the conflicts.
Due to the continuing violence, separation from Nigeria was
the best option for Biafra to restore peace and the only way of self-
preservation. Former Head of State, Yakubu Gowon, reinforced
the belief that harmonious co-existence was no longer possible and
that separation was the best way to restore peace in Nigeria.370
Indeed, the international community encourages and legitimizes
the separation of states, where such separation would enhance
peace, or where it is clear that the contending peoples can no
longer harmoniously co-exist. 371 The appropriate conditions for
secession, however, must exist.372 "Separation as an ultimate goal
may be preferred by the world community when it is more
promising for the sustenance of enduring peace and order." 373 For
instance, in the recent case of the former Yugoslavia, some
countries legitimized the actions of the successor states because
they were convinced that dialogue and harmonious co-existence
were no longer possible.374
Prior to Biafra's declaration of independence, the peoples of
the Eastern region had already exhausted all available options in
the exercise of the right of self-determination short of outright
independence. The federal government, however, repudiated all
such political arrangements. 375  Specifically, the federal
government precipitated Biafra's secession when it repudiated the
1967 Aburi accord.376
Biafra's historical claim to independence constitutes a
legitimate basis for secession. Before the unification of the
Eastern region with Nigeria, East Nigerians existed as self-
governing, independent entities.377 Even after the amalgamation,
the British authorities continued to treat the Eastern region as a de
370. BUCHHEIT, supra note 49, at 166.
371. See MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE: THE
NEW DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS 28 (1982).
372. Id.
373. M. Rafiqul Islam, Secessionist Self-Determination" Some Lessons from Katanga,
Biafra and Bangladesh, 22 J. PEACE RES. 211, 219 (1985).
374. Chancellor Kohl Statement, supra note 369, at 240.
375. See Onyeonoro S. Kamanu, Secession and the Right of Self-Determination: An
O.A. U. Dilemma, 12 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 355,361 (1974).
376. Id.
377. OLUWOLE IDOWU ODUMOSU, THE NIGERIAN CONsTIruTION: HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT 5 (1963).
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facto separate colonial entity by governing the region under a
different administrative structure. 378 As recently as 1957, the
Eastern region had an internal self-government with direct
representation in London,379 and sent its own delegates to various
constitutional conferences. 3
80
Prior to gaining independence, all of Nigeria treated the
Eastern region as a unit and did not discriminate between the
various peoples living within the region.381 Surprisingly, before
the British granted Nigeria independence, the peoples of the
Eastern region were denied the opportunity to vote for
independence as a separate colonial entity. They never had the
opportunity to decide whether they wanted to be part of an
independent Nigeria, or whether they wanted to express their
political position in some other way. In contrast, the peoples of
Northern and Southern Cameroon had the opportunity to decide
to which country they wished to belong before their incorporation
into Nigeria and Cameroon, respectively.382 The incorporation of
the Eastern region peoples into an independent Nigeria without
obtaining their consent constituted a violation of Chapter XI of
the U.N. Charter and Principle IX(b) of Resolution 1541:
[I]ntegration should be the result of the freely expressed wishes
of the territory's peoples acting with full knowledge of the
change in their status, their wishes having been expressed
through informed and democratic processes, impartially
conducted and based on universal adult suffrage.
383
The colonizing authorities denied the peoples of the Eastern
region the benefit of this provision, although the region was a
distinct entity before the advent of colonialism. The Eastern
region was a separate and self-governing entity until 1957.
Consequently, the peoples of the Eastern region did not exercise
their right of self-determination when Nigeria became
independent in 1960. Under international law, they could still
assert their right to self-determination by secession as specified in
Principle 4 of Resolution 1541 and Paragraph 4 of the Declaration.
378. Tamuno, supra note 4, at 565.
379. Nixon, supra note 48, at 481.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Elias, supra note 342, at 8-9.
383. Resolution 1514, supra note 110, at 30.
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Biafra's secession from Nigeria, based on the principle of self-
determination, was legally justified under the following factors:
there were gross violations of Biafran's human rights; Biafra had a
historical claim to independence; it was the most plausible way of
restoring peace in Nigeria; and the Nigerian government
discriminated against the Biafran population.
Biafra's secession received the overwhelming support of the
people of the Eastern region. Biafra's independence was declared
based on the mandate of the representatives of the peoples-the
Consultative Assembly of the Eastern region. The Declaration did
not supplant the will of the people. Moreover, Biafra's
independence accorded with international law.
The fact that Biafra was undermined in its efforts did not
render secession illegal under international law. Rather,' it
demonstrates the extent to which the self-interests of the
superpower nations could undermine a peoples' genuine attempt
to exercise their right of self-determination through secession.
Both the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations
willingly played as pawns on behalf of the interests of the
superpowers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Self-determination was conceived as vehicle for the
preservation of peace and the promotion of human rights.
Unfortunately, the concept has been characterized as disruptive
because of the principle's mismanagement. Various international
instruments and state practice demonstrate that, under the proper
conditions, international law recognizes secession as a legitimate
mode of exercising the right to self-determination.
A statement by the leader of the defunct Biafra Republic,
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, attempts to place Biafra's
struggle in context. He asserts, "For a time there were endless
wars in Europe, incessant conflicts until the old European empires
were dismantled, until the Balkans were Balkanized-then came
peace... Europe found peace through Balkanization, why not
Africa through Biafranization? ''384
384. HERACLIDES, supra note 353, at 91.
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